| Press Briefing at the Prime Minister’s Office for
Members of the Foreign Press |
Mr. Noriyuki Shikata, Deputy Cabinet Secretary for Public Relations: I would like to start today’s briefing for the international press at the Prime Minister’s Office. I am Noriyuki Shikata, Deputy Cabinet Secretary for Public Relations of the Prime Minister’s Office. Today’s briefers include, to my right, Mr. Hidehiko Nishiyama, Deputy Director-General of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA); to his right is Mr. Kenji Kasuga, Director of the Agricultural Production and Marketing Promotion Division, Agricultural Production Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF); to his very right is Mr. Takeshi Matsunaga, Assistant Press Secretary/Director, International Press Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; to my left is Mr. Shinichi Kawarada, Advisor to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT); to his left is Mr. Masanori Shinano, Counselor Secretariat of the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC); and, lastly, to his very left is Mr. Eiichi Yokota, Senior Technical Officer of the Food Safety Department of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW).
At the outset, I have three brief points to make.
One is, as is mentioned in Prime Minister Kan’s blog that was uploaded on Thursday, there is Reconstruction Action Campaign being started nationally last Thursday. This supports disaster-stricken areas from Japan as a whole by calling on people to refrain from excessive self-restraint and to take other actions. The Japanese government is supporting these areas through this campaign and we will emphatically support these efforts in partnership with the private sector.
Just two points from the weekend’s press conference by Mr. Edano, coming from Friday’s press conference. In response to a question on making highways in the Tohoku region toll-free, Mr. Edano responded that making the expressways toll-free would reduce the cost of reconstruction in many ways. Furthermore, it is likely that toll-free expressways would be the incentive needed to prevent permanent economic slowdown in the areas affected by the disaster. Concerning this, Mr. Edano believes that this is an issue that we should pursue very aggressively.
Also, asked on the issue of the second supplementary budget, as you know the Japanese Diet is now intensively deliberating on the first supplementary budget even during the last weekend, as well as today. When asked about the second supplementary budget, Mr. Edano commented, I quote, I think it is a given that the second supplementary budget will be required. However, no specific considerations are yet made. The Japanese government will examine the opinions provided by the Reconstruction Design Council and these will be linked through to measures to be included in the second supplementary budget.
This concludes my initial opening remarks. Now, I would like to ask Mr. Hidehiko Nishiyama of NISA to go next.
Mr. Nishiyama: Thank you, Mr. Shikata. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to give an update on the status of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
Regarding Unit 1, we are in the process of locating the surface of the water in the containment vessel. We will decide how much water per hour we will introduce to the containment vessel of Unit 1 in order to fill the water up to the top of the fuel. At the same time, we have to improve the condition in the reactor building in terms of radiation so that we can put equipment to measure the depth of the water introduced to the containment vessel and formulate a cooling system for the water. We will first provide an air filtering machine and then open the double door. Some irradiated materials might be discharged into the atmosphere.
Regarding Unit 2, our priority is to transfer the highly irradiated water in the trench to the irradiated waste disposal system. We already transferred more than 2,500t of water. We will formulate a water treatment system by the end of May, the capacity of which will be 1,200t per day. Purified water will be recycled to the pressured vessel for cooling the fuel and low-level irradiated water will be stored in the tanks. We need to lessen the radiation in the reactor building, also, in this Unit 2, to inject nitrogen to the containment vessel. The biggest problem of Unit 2 is that there may be a hole in the suppression pool. One idea is to fill the tallest room where the suppression pool is stored with sticky concrete, but there are some difficulties, such as how to introduce the concrete from outside the building. Regarding the spent fuel pool of Unit 2, we will be able to formulate a cooling system for this pool of Unit 2 possibly by the end of May.
Regarding Unit 3, the first priority is to remove debris to begin the work of nitrogen injection, filling the containment vessel with water, and formulation of a cooling system. We will follow the experience we will obtain with Unit 1. Regarding the spent fuel pool of Unit 3, we may be able to formulate a cooling system for the spent fuel pool of this Unit 3.
Regarding Unit 4, we are closely observing the water in the spent fuel pool of this unit. So far, we see no major damage for the spent fuel pool and the spent fuel themselves. We cannot find firm evidence that there is leakage in the pool. We are still investigating whether there is leakage in the pool. We will formulate a support structure under the spent fuel pool of Unit 4 so that it can be resilient against aftershocks.
Lastly, with respect to Unit 6, we transferred the stagnant water originated from the underground water from the turbine building of Unit 6 to a tank.
That is all for my report. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shikata: Now, I would like to ask Mr. Shinichi Kawarada of MEXT to go next.
Mr. Kawarada: Good afternoon, my name is Kawarada. On behalf of MEXT, I would like to explain to you the materials that I have brought to share with you. MEXT continues to take the measurements of the monitoring posts out of the 20km zone of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station for ground, air, and offshore. And, also, we are putting together the prefectural readings of environmental radioactivity. If you turn to page 5, this is the spatial measurement readings at monitoring points out of the 20km zone of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. It is very clear that during the past fortnight or even more we have continued to see the continuation of low levels of radiation. Of course there have been ups and downs but overall the trend has remained at a very low and flat level. That is for the spatial radiation.
We also have the readings for the offshore, which begins from page 8, and goes to pages 9 and 10, each indicating a monitoring post. The circle represents the 30km from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. If you go to pages 11 and 12, you will find the iodine-131 and cesium-134 and -137 levels at different points. If you go to page 4, for instance, we have the chronological trends starting from 23 March. By each nuclide you will find the numbers. Recently, you would agree that the situation has been somewhat stable, whereas in the past there were some short-time hikes.
Page 13 is the upper layer. Now, I have given you the upper layer, and this page illustrates the middle layer measurements for the radioactivity concentration. On page 14 we now have the bottom, seabed, lower layer. I would say 10m from the seabed is the lower layer. And, as is shown here, they are very close to nil or zero. In the past, there were certain times when there was a short rise, but overall it is very close to nil.
We also have the nationwide by-prefecture readings. On pages 22 and 23, you will find the spatial radiation levels by prefecture. Fukushima, of course, continues to demonstrate somewhat higher levels than times of normalcy. Ibaraki and Chiba also have recorded relatively higher readings, but other than that, the other prefectures continue to demonstrate the normal levels of radiation, or sometimes even lower than the average. On pages 25 and 26, we have the readings for the drinking water on page 25, and on page 26, the fallout. With the exception of areas surrounding Fukushima, the levels are very low, and even at Fukushima, they are below the allowable level.
Mr. Shikata: Mr. Shinano of NSC to go next.
Mr. Shinano: Thank you. From NSC, I would like to report to you the daily report of the evaluation of the environmental radiation monitoring results. I have prepared one set of material for your reference. The data that we have evaluated is based on the information published on 28 April and 29 April. Overall, there was no data that would impose a health hazard on the human body. The data that has been evaluated on the 22 April, the environmental monitoring enforcement plan had been formulated by the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, and based on this plan to reinforce the monitoring activities, a larger set of data had been subjected to the evaluation. So, the aerial radiation levels for iodine-131 and cesium-134 and -137 had not been detected in the previous day, but iodine-131 and cesium-134 and -137 had been detected at a relatively low level which is below the allowable limit.
Going on to the environmental sampling, off the coast of Fukushima prefecture, in the sea monitoring and sampling was carried out and on top of that the sea border that was sampled off the coast of Ibaraki had also been added for evaluation. The sea border off the coast of Fukushima, compared to the previous day’s level, the level became lower or was not detected. Therefore, the impact on human health is now minimized. So, the data from the coast of Ibaraki was the first sampling and iodine-134 and cesium-134 and -137 readings had been below the allowable limit.
Going on to the environmental radioactivity level by prefecture, the radioactive iodine had been increased over the previous evaluation result, but cesium had become lower. That concludes my daily report.
Mr. Yokota: So, starting from 28 April to 1 May, MHLW had received reports of the assessment of the food products and I am sorry the number of pages is larger; from pages 1 to 9 we have the readings from the inspection, and in the peripheral regions of Fukushima, a total of 193 samples had been tested. Those that had exceeded the tentative limit totaled 10 samples. The first one is carried on page 4, number 1, on the top: Sand lance in Ibaraki that exceeded the provisional limit. On page 6, you can see the line with the shadings as the same sample, which is sand lance from Ibaraki, that also exceeded the provisional limit. Going on to pages 8 and 9, starting with the Fukushima—grown shiitake mushrooms grown outdoors, a total of 5 samples, and then on page 9, ostrich fern grown in Fukushima, and also bamboo shoots produced in Fukushima that exceeded the provisional limits as well. The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters had issued orders to ban shipment and the prefectural government had asked all the farmers to restrain from shipping. Either of these measures have been taken.
Page 10 is the summary of the results of the tests. We have tallied all the results from the 19 march to 1 May, and 2,400 samples had been tested all in all. On page 11, from the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, the food that had been issued for the ban of shipment are summarized. Those in italics are the ones that have the shipment ban still valid. So, for part of Fukushima, raw milk and vegetables, and also marine products, that would be sand lance, and spinach grown in part of Ibaraki. These are banned from shipment. And raw milk from Fukushima from 21 March to 1 May, that is on the bottom of the page. Yesterday, part of the raw milk produced in Fukushima had the ban lifted.
Mr. Shikata: I would like to ask Mr. Kasuga of MAFF to go next.
Mr. Kasuga: Thank you. This is from MAFF. There are no materials that we have brought from our ministry. So that is all.
Mr. Shikata: Mr. Matsunaga from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Matsunaga: Thank you, Mr. Shikata. Today I’d like to report to you about three points. First, the Japan-US Foreign Ministers meeting which was held last Friday. Foreign Minister Matsumoto was visiting Washington D.C. and had a meeting with Secretary of State Mrs. Clinton. There they agreed to work jointly against reputational damages with respect to Japanese products. That is a high priority that was identified in the meeting. Also, they agree to work closely to address and prevent concern about Japan’s role as supply chain. Foreign Minister Matsumoto expressed his deep gratitude with respect to assistance from the United States towards the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, and he wished to cooperate closely with the United States in the forthcoming international discussions with respect to nuclear safety.
Next, Foreign Minister Matsumoto opined in the international press. More specifically, he contributed to the International Herald Tribune last Saturday. His message there was stressing that Japan is open for business and he emphasized that the best way to assist Japan would be to visit Japan and to buy Japanese products.
Thirdly, and lastly, I’d like to mention about the next stop of his visit, Berlin. There, he had a meeting together with nine other foreign ministers of non-nuclear-weapon countries. In the meeting, Foreign Minister Matsumoto emphasized that the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant would enter into a new phase of “planned and stabilizing action phase” and he emphasized that it is the intention of the government of Japan to thoroughly investigate the accident and share the lessons with the international community. The outcome of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting was made public in the form of their joint statement. For your reference, the relevant paper is on the table. Thank you.
Mr. Shikata: Now we’d like to open the floor for questions. When you ask a question, please identify yourself. Please use the microphone.
QUESTION (Mr. Yoshida, Japan Times): I have a special question for Mr. Nishiyama. First, we are trying to leave a record in documentary form regarding the initial phases of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station crisis. I have a few related questions in this regard. My first question is, when did you hear for the first time about this crisis and what was your impression when you first heard about the crisis? Also, when did you understand the seriousness of the crisis, and what impression did you have then? Also, what was your worst-case scenario regarding the crisis? That is my first question.
My second question is, in the weekly magazine AERA, it is mentioned that TEPCO initially had a plan to inject fresh water. Was NISA aware of the amount of water that TEPCO was initially planning to inject? Because when we look at the numbers for the volume of fresh water that TEPCO was initially intending to inject, it seems that the volume is rather small. Was this because they could not inject large volumes of water until the pressure was higher, or was it because they had to vent first before they could inject larger volumes of water? Also, in the Wall Street Journal they talk about the timing of the vent, and apparently in the United States there is a manual stating that the venting should be undertaken before the pressure within the containment vessel reaches the design level of pressure. In the case of Japan, I understand that the vent is not done until the pressure reaches double that level. What kind of manual or estimates do you have regarding the vent? Do TEPCO and NISA have any kind of manual regarding the vent and the timing of the vent? It seems that as a result, if the vent was delayed, that could have resulted in major damage to the reactor, so what kind of manual do you have regarding the procedures for the timing of the vent?
Mr. Nishiyama: Regarding the points that you have just raised in your question, in part due to the fact that I myself was not necessarily involved in the initial stages, it would be difficult to give you accurate information at this point in time, so I believe it would be better if I give you the information after I have a chance to sort out the related information.
Regarding procedures for the vent, the procedures for the vent are provided in the accident manual for the nuclear power operators’ manual.
And to the extent that I am aware, having observed the situation from the sidelines, I understand that TEPCO, as well as those in the government involved in the initial phases, did have a common understanding regarding the need for venting. The actual procedures were taken, leading to the actual vent of the reactor.
Regarding the article in AERA, since I have not read that article, I would not be able to comment on it here.
QUESTION (Mr. Yoshida, Japan Times): Is it mentioned in the manual, the actual level of the pressure at which the vent should be done? Because it appears that as a result of the delay in the vent, the hydrogen explosion occurred, resulting in damage to the reactor. So do you have the understanding that the delay in the vent has led to damages in the reactor?
Mr. Nishiyama: Regarding at what level of pressure the vent would be undertaken, it is provided in the rules that the venting should at least be done when the pressure reaches twice the level of the design pressure. But even prior to that, depending on the direction of the wind, it is possible to vent.
Regarding how the accident has led to the current situation, that is a matter that we are going to be analyzing so I would not be able to say anything for sure at this moment.
Mr. Shikata: Could we give opportunities for questions from the other participants.
QUESTION (Mr. Normile, Science): Perhaps Mr. Kawarada of MEXT can address this and perhaps Mr. Shikata as well. This concerns the allowable radiation levels for schools in Fukushima. I was looking into this even before Professor Kosako resigned over the weekend. The guideline issued on 19 April by the Ministry refers to International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 109. It correctly states that in Publication 109, the recommendation is for a yearly radiation dose between 1 and 20mSv. However, the most appropriate explanation of this that I can find in 109 is, and this is a direct quote “The reference level for the optimization of protection of people living in contaminated areas should be selected in the lower part of the 1 to 20mSv per year band” Can you explain how the Ministry arrived at setting the limit of 20mSv? That seems to be the absolute upper limit that is given as the ICRP recommendation. It also seems to me that really this is not in the spirit of the ICRP recommendation. Is there some other part of this publication that indicates that the 20mSv per year limit is acceptable? Again, my reading of that document is that, to optimize exposure, the limit should be in the lower part of the 1 to 20 mSv per year band.
Also, the method of that calculation, of figuring that school children will be outdoors for eight hours a day and potentially get 3.8µSv per hour, but then will be indoors for the rest of the day – where did that computation come from? I’ve asked some international experts in radiation dose symmetry and they were unfamiliar with that kind of computation being used in any previous situation. So just two basic questions, can you explain how the Ministry’s recommendation fits within the ICRP recommendation and how is this eight hours outside and 16 hours inside – where did that come from?
Mr. Kawarada: As a provisional approach to ensure the safety of children and students, taking into account the recommendation of ICRP, as well as advice from the NSC, and the views of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters headed by the Prime Minister, based on and taking into account these views, MEXT has arrived at this view.
This view has been adopted, taking into account the fact that the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station is not yet under control even now. Taking into account the recommendations of the ICRP as well as the reference levels in cases where the accident is still ongoing, which is provided as 20 to 100mSv per year, we have taken the lowest number of 20mSv per year as a starting point Also we have adopted, as a provisional estimate, the range of 1 to 20mSv, which is provided as the levels allowed, after the accident is brought under control, and arrived at our policy, that it would be appropriate to reduce the radiation dosage for children and students as much as possible.
In other words, the level of 1 to 20mSv is a level that has been provided as a provisional level, in order to try to keep the levels lower, as much as possible. So this does not mean that 20mSv is allowed. It means that we wish to keep the levels, as much as possible, below 20mSv.
And in response to your second question about the assumption that is used here of eight hours outdoors and the remaining 16 hours indoors, as a provisional approach we are assuming eight hours outdoors, but when we consider the general living patterns of children and students, it is hard to conceive that children would be outdoors for eight hours on normal days. The number of hours children and students spend outdoors should actually be lower than eight hours. Also, we do not assume any attenuation in the radioactive nuclides. Also, we assume here that school buildings and also kindergarten buildings are made of concrete, which means that the ambient radiation dose in concrete buildings would be lower than in wood-built homes. So we take into consideration all of these three elements and have arrived at the safest levels.
So the levels we have announced represent a provisional approach, which aims to keep the actual radiation dose at a far lower level than 20mSv.
QUESTION (Mr. Normile, Science): If I could follow-up, I believe every schoolyard in Fukushima Prefecture has been checked for radiation. This information is probably on the web somewhere. Are there any schools where there is 3.8µSv per hour of radiation in the schoolyard?
Mr. Nishiyama: I don’t have the total number of schools in Fukushima Prefecture with me right now. Regarding the 3.8µSv, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, at his press conference on Saturday, mentioned that there have been restrictions based on the usage of schools, as of 28 April. 11 out of the 13 schools for which restrictions have been placed on the use of the school grounds already have a radiation level that is lower than 3.8µSv.
QUESTION (Mr. Knittel, Freelance): There was an article last week in the Japan Times, that in most nuclear power plants there are not enough diesel generators to replace the electricity, if the normal cooling system does not function. So in this case all or most nuclear power plants can’t cool down the power plant in an emergency case. Could you comment on this article? Is this true?
Mr. Nishiyama: First of all, all nuclear power station do have systems to deal with earthquakes and tsunamis, based on the knowledge that has been obtained so far, so that they can deal with any earthquake or tsunami that may come. The emergency diesel generators are also equipped in the nuclear power stations in order to deal with such situations.
However, what happened at Fukushima this time was far beyond the knowledge and experience that mankind has had up to now and all the emergency systems did not function as well. Given the situation we have instructed all the nuclear power stations to put in place power source vehicles or emergency pump vehicles at a location at a high altitude where a tsunami could never reach, in order to be able to maintain the cooling system, even if such an emergency occurs.
QUESTION (Mr. Dawson, Wall Street Journal): Just two questions. Firstly, on 11 March, the day of the quake, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, at a press briefing, said that some type of coolant material, I think it was boron but it has been reported as reikyakuzai, was sent to Japan. I would like to know, was that request rejected or what happened with that? Why was that not actually delivered at the time, as the US Secretary of State said.
Secondly, in the days after the earthquake, this would be the first week, can you tell me, are you aware of what the minimum number of people from TEPCO was at the Fukushima Daiichi site? I think from about 7,000 on the day of the quake it then rapidly went down, but as of I think Tuesday or Wednesday after the quake, my understanding is that there were about 50 people at the site. If that’s incorrect could you tell me the number? Thank you.
Mr. Nishiyama: Regarding your question about the statement made by State Secretary Clinton, nobody on our side considers that we rejected the offer. I mean we do not believe we rejected that offer. As to what happened to that boron we do not know at this point in time.
Also, in response to your second question regarding the number of people from TEPCO onsite, we do not know the numbers.
QUESTION (Mr. Dawson, Wall Street Journal): If I could just follow up briefly on the numbers, is that something you can determine? I’m a little confused. You just don’t know right now? Or you never knew? Or you can’t know? Is that something I could maybe get later? Thank you.
Mr. Nishiyama: I believe we will be able to check on the numbers. Having said that, the numbers that you gave me, that is from 7,000 to 50, seems to be such a huge gap, so I don’t think that might be the case, but in any case we will look into whether we can check on these numbers or not.
QUESTION (Mr. Normile, Science): Just a quick question. A radiation biologist I spoke to here in Japan suggested that the easiest thing the government could do to reassure parents of children in Fukushima would be to buy school children one of those radiation dose badges and let them wear those badges for a month, and then check what dose of radiation they are actually getting. Is that under consideration?
Mr. Kawarada: Rather than have each of the students or children wear dosimeters, we have taken measures to have the teachers carry a simplified type of dosimeter and to report on the measurements.
QUESTION (Mr. Yoshida, Japan Times): I’m sorry for being so persistent regarding the vent. I heard from your earlier response that you were trying to do the vent based on a political decision but the work proved to be rather difficult, leading to the delay, but actually, the risk of a meltdown at the reactor was known at 10:00 by NISA and was reported to the Prime Minister at 10:30, but it was not until 13:30 that Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano gave orders for the vent, resulting in the delay. There was actually a full day between being actually aware of the risk and the actual order. My question is, why did it take so much time until the decision for the vent was made and do you believe the delay in the vent eventually led to the damage to the reactor that was eventually seen?
Mr. Nishiyama: On that point, regarding how the decision was made within the government for the vent and how that led to actions taken by TEPCO and how that led to progress or developments in the accident at Unit 1 we will not know until we do a thorough review of the situation, so I would not be able to respond to that question here and now.
QUESTION (Mr. Yoshida, Japan Times): At least then, can you please provide us with the data, for instance the amount of water that was injected as was mentioned in AERA, or the pressure level? Although I do see that you would have to do a thorough review from here onwards, can you at least provide us with the data that you have, because I feel that the data that is being disclosed on the website now seems to be somewhat different from the numbers that were announced by the Prime Minister’s Office at that time.
Mr. Nishiyama: Regarding the data, we have given orders to TEPCO to provide the information and give us the report. So once we receive that report and the numbers I believe that would basically be made public.
Mr. Shikata: We would like to conclude today’s briefing. The next briefing is going to take place on Friday. Thank you very much for coming.
(END)
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